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FOREWORD
In this monograph, Dr. Mark R. Shulman offers a novel thesis
to explain the value of an important new security initiative with
considerable implications for the future use of force in operations
other than war. While this initiative is still in its formative stages,
it may eventually change the use of force paradigm in which
military leaders and political decisionmakers operate. And despite
its promise, no one has yet attempted a comprehensive analysis of
it. Dr. Shulman’s monograph draws on publicly available sources
from governmental publications and press releases, the international
news media, and think tank strategic analyses, as well the relevant
historical materials. Based on this wide review of the literature, Dr.
Shulman argues that the Proliferation Security Initiative is changing
long-held international norms about the conditions for the use of
force to ensure strategic objectives.
To date, the Initiative has drawn mostly on the resources of
the Navy, Coast Guard, and the State Department; it offers several
important lessons for soldiers as well. Most importantly, Dr.
Shulman argues that the Proliferation Security Initiative will help to
break down some of the obstacles that currently prevent the United
States and its allies from using targeted military missions to achieve
critical security objectives without triggering a state of war. Readers
familiar with the history of the past 50 years will recall that the
general tendency in the law of war has been to expand the protections
afforded to those not in uniform. Nuremberg clarified the ban on
aggression. The 1949 Geneva Conventions codify the principles of
proportionality and discrimination to protect noncombatants. The
Additional Protocols of 1977 protect fighters in internal wars even
if they are not in uniform. The laudable purpose of these laws is
to reduce the sphere of warfare as narrowly as possible, to make
it more humane by limiting the scope and scale of its targets. At
the same time, however, the laws of war have had the unintended
consequence of making it more difficult for law-abiding nations to
use highly focused instruments of force. Assassinations have been
effectively outlawed, leading to less discriminating coups and the
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covert fulmination of revolutions. Embargoes have been abandoned,
leading to virtually indiscriminate sanction regimes. The cumulative
impact is difficult to calculate but may well add up to more suffering
by the innocent and more distrust of the good.
The law of war allows the use of awesome violence under narrow
circumstances. The law of peace permits very few and narrowly
circumscribed uses of force. In a world with globalized threats,
myriad menaces, and ever wider dissemination of weapons of mass
destruction, the stark distinctions between these legal regimes is
fraying. The Proliferation Security Initiative may offer a way to cover
the gap. As it does, each of the military services will need to develop
new doctrine and new capabilities. While the Initiative is focusing
right now on maritime operations, interdictions on land may not be
not far behind. So I encourage you to read this monograph with an
eye toward the future.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have menaced mankind
for six decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the threat has changed
dramatically with the development of new weapons, with the rise
of transnational criminal and terrorist organizations, and with a
diminishing capacity of some states to control the weapons they
have. In the hands of an Al Qaeda, such a weapon threatens to kill
tens of thousands and destroy tens of billions of dollars worth of
property. It could bring global trade to a standstill and trigger panic,
economic depression, and widespread suffering the likes of which
have not been seen for many years.
Containing the threat of WMD requires action on several fronts.
States that legitimately possess nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons must work to ensure that they will not be used and that
they eventually will be decommissioned. States that illegitimately
possess them must abandon them. States that do not possess them
must refrain from obtaining them. Nonstate actors must never
possess them. One key to achieving these objectives is to halt the
flow of WMD across borders.
The U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative is a bold and timely
multilateral initiative to prevent the proliferation of WMD and the
materials used to construct them. To accomplish this objective, the
Initiative facilitates information-sharing in order to better identify
and locate shipments of WMD. It also contemplates the interdiction
of shipments of weapons and materials—by force if necessary. Since
announced in 2003, the Initiative’s efforts have focused on halting the
flow of WMD across the world’s oceans. In the future, its activities
may extend to land-based interdictions.
While a product of a presidential administration infamous for
its unilateralism, the Initiative has received widespread support.
United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan has explicitly
endorsed it. At least 60 states are participating in it at one level or
another, including Great Britain, but also France, Russia, Germany,
Italy, Japan, and Spain. Unfortunately, support is not universal.
The Initiative constitutes one of the most important recent
developments in the area of international peace and security, and
vii

may also add up to the most exciting changes in the area of public
international law. It has the potential to alter fundamentally the
transnational legal framework for the use of force by states. Force
may become a more ordinary tool that sits on a spectrum of means
by which political objectives can be achieved. By blurring the lines
between war and peace, the Initiative eventually may permit states
to use highly targeted and entirely proportionate force for limited
purposes to further security objectives without triggering war and
all the horrors that it entails.
Implementation of this Initiative raises serious legal challenges
by questioning the basic principles of the international system: the
sovereignty of states in general and freedom of the seas in particular.
The Initiative eventually may overcome these challenges by increasing
the transparency of its decisionmaking apparatus and criteria, by
continuing to expand its base of support through diplomacy and
dialogue, and working within the rule of law to create a new base
norm that prohibits the proliferation of WMD. This monograph
describes the Initiative, its legal status, and its prospects for becoming
a significant tool in the quest to prevent mass destruction.
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THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
AS A NEW PARADIGM FOR PEACE AND SECURITY
Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win
wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.
Bernard Brodie
The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, 1946

Sixty years ago, strategic analyst Bernard Brodie took serious
stock of the military threats and missions in a world with atomic
bombs. He recognized that this new class of weapons would cause
intolerable destruction, and therefore the United States could
no longer afford to wait for the enemy to strike first. In the halfcentury that followed, mutual assured destruction served to avert a
catastrophic strike. More recently, the threat has changed as enemies
who cannot be deterred have sought to possess weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). While the range of catastrophic threats has
expanded dramatically, the means the military establishment has to
avert wars has not grown accordingly.
Because the international security system is premised on
exceedingly strong notions of national sovereignty, the United States
may not seize a shipload of nuclear weapons moving from North
Korea to Iran for ultimate use by terrorists. Russia may not force the
landing of an airplane carrying anthrax from the Sudan to Chechnya
until that craft enters Russian airspace. In other words, terrorists,
revolutionaries, and rogue states are virtually free to ship WMD as
they wish. Without some significant changes to the system, the use
of WMD against civilians seems virtually inevitable.
This monograph addresses one significant undertaking that
seeks to change the system by enabling concerned states to interdict
international trade in WMD. As such, the Proliferation Security
Initiative (the “PSI” or “Initiative”) not only addresses one of the
most urgent threats to peace and security that the world has ever
witnessed, but it does so in an innovative way that has the potential
to change the basic paradigm of peace and security by legitimizing
the proportional and discriminating use of force to prevent a great
harm.


This monograph proceeds in eight sections. Section I introduces
the Initiative and discusses some of the legal, political and strategic
issues it raises. Section II discusses the threats that the proliferation
of WMD pose and the ways that the Initiative seeks to address them.
Section III presents those few operational details publicly available.
Section IV takes up the complicated questions raised by the PSI.
Part of the Initiative’s brilliance lies in its flexibility, but this design
element makes it difficult to identify who is participating and at
what level. It also leaves open questions about whom the Initiative
targets. To date, the Initiative has focused on operations to interdict
the flow of weapons at sea, a prospect that raises significant legal
concerns because a theoretical interdiction might contravene the
strong tradition of freedom of the seas. Section V examines existing
and potential legal arguments that would allow interdictions.
Section VI picks up the thread by examining the efforts to overcome
any legal obstacles through the essentially political actions of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Section VII then looks at
the implications for the Department of Defense (DoD), and for the
Army in particular. While the PSI’s efforts to date have focused on
maritime operations, it may eventually involve land-based forces as
the counterproliferation norm matures. Finally, Section VIII draws
some conclusions and makes a few concrete recommendations about
how to build support and improve the fit between the PSI and its
critical mission.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROLIFERATION
SECURITY INITIATIVE AND ITS OBJECTIVES
The Proliferation Security Initiative is a multilateral initiative
intended to prevent the proliferation of WMD and the materials used
to construct them. “The goal of the PSI is to create a more dynamic,
creative, and proactive approach to preventing proliferation transfers
to or from nation states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern.”1
To accomplish this objective, the PSI establishes links to facilitate
information sharing between countries. The Initiative organizes
multinational exercises to train for the interdiction of these weapons
on the high seas or the airspace above them. The PSI’s activities are
intended mostly to enable its supporters to identify cross-border


trafficking in WMD and to halt it. It explicitly contemplates boarding
ships and, if necessary, using armed force to seize weapons and the
materials used to make them. Its Statement of Principles also includes
undertakings by its participants to board and search vessels reasonably
suspected of transporting WMD (including their delivery systems)
and to refrain from transporting WMD themselves. Its signers also
undertake to consider providing consent to boarding and searching
vessels carrying their flags. Subsequent bilateral agreements have
been signed to allow the United States to board ships bearing flags
of convenience under certain circumstances.
Since its inception, the Initiative’s efforts have focused on halting
the flow of WMD across the world’s oceans. In the future, its activities
may extend to land-based interdictions. Most of the participants in
these exercises are the naval and air forces of the United States and
the various regional powers that would presumably undertake any
interdiction in the future.
President George W. Bush announced the Initiative in Krakow,
Poland, on May 31, 2003. A few months later, 11 states signed
a Statement of Principles, an ambitious document (see appendix)
that provides very few details. Since that time, the PSI has gained
widespread support from United Nations (UN) Secretary General
Kofi Annan and 60 states including those traditionally known as
the “Great Powers”: Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy,
Japan, and Spain. Unfortunately, some states have not endorsed it.
This monograph examines some of the reasons that the Initiative has
not garnered universal support and proposes ways to achieve it.
The Initiative is both bold and timely. It constitutes one of the
most important recent developments in the area of international
peace and security and may also add up to the most exciting change
in the area of public international law, since it may fundamentally
alter the transnational legal framework for the use of force by states.
As it gains acceptance, force may become a more ordinary tool for
ensuring compliance with the dictates of international security. By
blurring the lines between war and peace, the PSI permits the use
of force to further security objectives without triggering war and
all that state implies. And yet, despite the Initiative’s novelty and
importance, it has attracted remarkably little scholarly or policy-



relevant attention.2 Moreover, because the Initiative lacks a central
office, an international secretariat, an operational handbook and
rules of engagement, or even congressional authorization, it remains
shrouded in mystery.
While the Initiative constitutes a highly innovative concept for
responding to one of the most urgent sets of problems that society
faces, its implementation also raises several significant legal and
policy issues. That it raises issues should not be surprising. Significant
changes to international norms have always faced obstacles; that is
the nature of complex systems. Historical examples abound. For
instance, consensus was slow to form around such momentous
issues as the outlawing of piracy, the slave trade, and eventually
genocide. More recently, the international community has been
hesitant to outlaw aviation piracy or other acts of terrorism. And
now the international community is halting and unsure about how
to proceed in the face of nuclear proliferation. The PSI is acting as a
catalyst for the development of a new norm that allows the use of
force to interdict the flow of WMD.
A definitive conclusion about the legal status of the Initiative is
elusive for several reasons related to its lack of a discernable structure.
Different states have presented diverging views of the relevant law
that governs the Initiative’s activities. Also, because the PSI seeks to
address proliferation events as they arise, no one knows yet what
actions its members will take and, therefore, what legal arguments
will be required to support them. Finally, the PSI contains the seed
of a new kind of law, a universal ban on the proliferation of WMD,
and this law has yet to be fully articulated, let alone tested.
As the lead participant, the U.S. legal position is critical and
has been evolving since 2003. Then Undersecretary of State John R.
Bolton defended the PSI’s legality at the time as based on the right to
collective self-defense. This justification proved to be overreaching.
Other PSI core members failed to endorse it, and Secretary Bolton
subsequently dropped it.3 More recently, the State Department
vaguely has claimed that the “PSI activities will be consistent with
domestic and international legal frameworks, many of which, in
turn, implement existing nonproliferation structures.”4 This claim
deserves detailed analysis and explanation in order to justify it in the



face of contrary claims and also to spell out some of the opportunities
opened by widespread endorsement of the PSI. Going further, this
monograph also will argue that in order to implement the PSI, its
supporters are altering international law in ways that may increase
its very scope and relevance.
To meet a global threat, the PSI is ambitious in its geographic
scope. WMD may originate almost anywhere and, in light of the
intention of some nonstate actors to obtain them,5 they may be bound
for almost anywhere. Countries of origin could include North Korea,
Iran, China, Syria, Pakistan, India, Israel, Vietnam, Sudan, Egypt,
Yemen, Cuba, and almost any of the former Soviet republics. From
there, the weapons could be transshipped anywhere on earth before
arriving at their ultimate destination or target. Therefore, the threat
is global.
In the face of a global threat, who sets strategy? The PSI declarations to date leave ambiguous its decisionmaking apparatus. Who
will decide when and how to act? What role does the United States
play? Is the decisionmaking process entirely ad hoc? The PSI Statement
of Principles does not establish any detailed policies relating to the
Initiative’s purpose, decisionmaking apparatus, targets, or means.
The Statement does elaborate somewhat on the concept:
“States or nonstate actors of proliferation concern” generally refers to
those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish
should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged
in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2)
transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery
systems, or related materials.

This formal statement begs more questions than it answers. Is there a
list of states or nonstate actors of concern? What is required in order
to establish that they should be subject to interdiction activities?
Are radioactive materials that could be used to create radiological
devices (dirty bombs) subject to interdiction? Why are some states
permitted to acquire WMD or transfer them? Which states?
Informal statements do provide additional insights into the
Initiative’s objectives. Its architect, John Bolton, has stated that the
Initiative will not target states that possess WMD “legitimately.”


This statement presupposes a legal conclusion that is at best vague.
Presumably it means that at least China, Russia, Great Britain, and
France will not be subjected to the Initiative’s interdiction efforts so
long as they do not export these weapons to rogue states or nonstate
actors.6 As long-time declared nuclear powers under the terms of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and
each wielding a UNSC veto, they appear to be insulated from the
reach of the PSI.
Other informal statements about the PSI’s objectives are less
vague but are self-contradicting. A British government expert states
that the PSI does,
not target any country or countries in particular . . . Rather the goal is to
prevent the development or acquisition of WMD by all nonstate actors
(such as terrorists) and states of concern, together with those who supply
such programmes through trafficking in sensitive materials, equipment
and technology—whether states, individuals, private companies, or
other entities.7

That there are some “states of concern” appears to belie the claim that
the PSI does not target any countries in particular. The ambiguity
and tension inherent in this statement are indicative of the fluidity
of the Initiative. It does not target any specific country, while at the
same time preventing proliferation to or from “states of concern.” It is
this sort of ambiguity—and the apparent discretion it permits—that
causes some commentators to question whether the PSI conforms to
the rule of law. Vague policy statements about “states of concern,”
however, are not the same thing as acts of violence, and the PSI’s
legitimacy cannot be prejudged on the basis of these statements
alone. Ultimately, the actions taken on behalf of the PSI and the law
that governs those actions will determine the Initiative’s legitimacy.
The results will illuminate its wisdom.
Likewise, it remains unclear how the PSI’s participants would act
if faced with information indicating that a shipment originated in a
state that is neither a party to the NPT, nor a long-standing nuclear
power (Israel), nor a powerful state with considerable international
leverage such as India or Pakistan.8 Given Pakistan’s recent history
and its apparent inability or unwillingness to halt the export of
WMD, claims that it will get a free pass seem premature.9 But as


veteran weapons inspector David Kaye notes, “This is the age-old
problem with Pakistan and the U.S. Other priorities always trump
the United States from coming down hard on Pakistan’s nuclear
proliferation. And it goes back 15 to 20 years.” Likewise proliferation
expert Gary Milhollin notes that “it seems bizarre that we are letting
the Pakistanis get away with nuclear smuggling because we think
they’ll help fight terrorism.”10 The best evidence publicly available
suggests that India, Pakistan, and Israel will not be targeted—at least
for now.11
The case of Pakistan illustrates the PSI’s potential for changing
the use of force paradigm to achieve international peace and security.
Clearly, from a counterproliferation perspective, the PSI should not
grant Pakistan a free ride. Other important considerations arise,
however, because of Pakistan’s role as a critical ally in the struggle
against terrorism. One of the PSI’s greatest strengths is the flexibility
it offers. The traditional international security order viewed the world
as governed by fully sovereign states with a small number of states
whose sovereignty is impaired temporarily (either because they are
“failed” states, or client states, or those subject to UN sanctions).
Traditionally, international law does not offer much support to those
seeking to discriminate between the rights of different states based on
an interpretation of their so-called “legitimacy.” Instead, it treats the
legitimacy and sovereignty of all states with equal dignity except in
those few instances in which states violate obligations that are either
self-imposed by custom or treaty, or imposed upon them by the UN
Security Council. In contrast, the PSI implies a less rigid concept of
sovereign autonomy in which a state no longer has complete freedom
to engage in reckless activities that endanger another’s security.
The PSI must prevent weak states from trafficking in WMD, while
not further undermining their capacity to govern themselves. The
United States can neither afford to ignore Pakistan’s proliferation
nor to destabilize (or alienate) its government.
Eventually the PSI must develop enough support that it can halt
proliferation from all countries, including those that are powerful
or that have special influence as allies in the global struggle against
terrorism. Granting free passes to oneself or one’s friends runs
contrary to the basic principles of the rule of law. It sets the grantor



and the grantee above the law. The rule of law is premised upon
the notion that no one is above it. And for the PSI to support a
transnational order based on this principle, it should do everything
feasible to abide by the rule of law itself. On the other hand, it may
take years for supporters of the PSI to establish the legal capacity
to target important countries that proliferate; in the meantime
solicitousness for the most robust interpretations of the rule of
law should not be permitted to cripple the entire effort. Soldiers,
diplomats, policymakers, and their lawyers should embrace the PSI
and strive to strengthen it as an important counterproliferation tool.
A New Form of Multilateralism.
The Initiative offers a new model for multilateral cooperation
that avoids cumbersome treaty apparatus. From the beginning, the
George W. Bush administration has been notoriously unfriendly to
traditional multilateral conventions. Diplomats and lawyers have
been accustomed to drafting and interpreting such treaties for
decades. The postwar system of international peace and security is
framed in great part by such treaties. Prior to September 11, 2001
(9/11), the Bush administration withdrew the United States from
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, abandoned negotiations on START
II, and decided not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It
has stalled efforts to improve the Biological Weapons Convention
regime.12 It has failed to encourage ratification of the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea despite strong support in Congress and its
own Departments of State and Defense. The administration took
the unprecedented step of “unsigning” the 1998 Rome Charter of
the International Criminal Court. The administration’s antipathy to
exposing Americans to charges in international tribunals is so strong
that it expended considerable diplomatic capital to ensure blanket
exemptions for Americans before the new International Criminal
Court, despite the charter’s provisions and political considerations
making any such prosecution exceptionally unlikely.13
At the same time, the administration’s efforts to build multinational coalitions have been widely derided as fig leaves for unilateral
action. These complaints, whatever their merit, do not mean that the
administration has been ignoring the roles that other states can play


in maintaining peace and security. The PSI represents a prominent
example of the administration’s thinking about how to build
transnational support to protect American interests. It envisions a
new kind of multilateral security agreement—one with considerable
advantages over the heavily negotiated and thus cumbersome
treaties to which lawyers and diplomats have grown accustomed.
While it is beyond the scope of this monograph to explore them all,
other U.S.-led transnational security initiatives since 9/11 should at
least be noted to give the reader an idea of their range and scope. In
addition to the PSI,14 they include the Container Security Initiative,15
the Customs-Trade Partnerships against Terrorism,16 the Regional
Maritime Security Initiative,17 and the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative.18 Also, the PSI has a nonproliferation analogue in the
Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of
Mass Destruction.19 Each is an activity, not an organization. Not one
of the initiatives is established by a multilateral treaty that has been
signed and ratified by each participant. And yet, cumulatively, these
initiatives may be building a new system that responds effectively
and legitimately to the security demands of the 21st century.
II. THE GRAVEST DANGER:
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Since the advent of the Nuclear Age, everything has changed save our
modes of thinking, and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.
Albert Einstein20

Terrorists wielding WMD present the greatest threat to our
civilization.21 If used by a terrorist group, chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons could cause the deaths of thousands or even millions
of innocent people. During a debate with Senator John F. Kerry during
the 2004 presidential campaign, President Bush said, “I agree with
my opponent that the biggest threat facing this country is weapons
of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist network.”22 The more
widely such weapons are distributed, the more likely their use. These
weapons, or the means to build them, are increasingly accessible to
states and nonstate actors alike. The threat of widespread disease or



death posed by naturally (or unintentionally) occurring agents such
as zoonotic diseases23 or gigantic meteors24 may eventually prove
more deadly, but the likelihood of these threats seems impossible to
establish. The eventual use of WMD against civilians seems likely.
Harvard’s Graham Allison grimly forecasts, “on the current path, a
nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely
than not.”25 The PSI is one new tool in the effort to prevent such an
attack or attacks. One of its strengths is that it does not pretend to
be a silver bullet; rather it is part of a growing network of networks,
each adding layers of security. A silver bullet might miss its target
but a network of defenses would reduce the threat with every layer.
Political Support from International Institutions.
International support for the PSI is widespread but ambivalent.
As noted above, the U.S. Government claims that at least 60 nations
are participating in the Initiative, but a comprehensive statement
listing those states and the actual level of participation has not
been released. Individual states that participate in the Initiative are
discussed. First, however, this monograph discusses the support of
the most politically significant international entities: the UN and the
European Union (EU). Later in section VI, it will examine the legal
arguments to support counterproliferation and the PSI.
The UN has endorsed the PSI concept but stopped short of
requiring its member states to pass legislation to enact it when it
passed Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) in April 2004.
UN Secretary General Annan has endorsed the PSI as integral to the
nonproliferation regime: “President Bush’s Proliferation Security
Initiative is another important step. These measures must be fully
enforced.”26 The Secretary General’s report, In Larger Freedom, noted
that while the NPT “remains the foundation of the non-proliferation
regime, we should welcome recent efforts to supplement it.”
Specifically, the report continues, these,
include UN Security Council Resolution 1540 designed to prevent
nonstate actors from gaining access to nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons, technology and materials, and their means of delivery; and the
voluntary Proliferation Security Initiative, under which more and more
States are cooperating to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons.27
10

Likewise the UN Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges,
and Change notes that recent,
experience of the activities of the A.Q. Khan Network has demonstrated
the need for and the value of measures taken to interdict the illicit and
clandestine trade in components for nuclear programmes.28 This problem
is currently being addressed on a voluntary basis by the Proliferation
Security Initiative. We believe that all States should join this voluntary
initiative.29

These statements contribute to the legitimacy of the PSI, politically
and morally. Their jurisprudential significance, however, is
ambiguous and evolving. At this point, the UN’s contributions to
promoting the PSI, therefore, have been essentially limited to the
Secretary General’s voicing of support. And as long as China remains
opposed, the UN’s vast authority under Chapter VII of the Charter
will remain dormant with respect to the PSI.
After the UN, the EU is probably the next most significant source
of the PSI’s political legitimacy. The EU’s position has evolved quickly
over the past couple of years with each new statement increasingly
supportive. The EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction promulgated by the European Council in December
2003 did not mention the Initiative explicitly in its position against
proliferation. An otherwise comprehensive document, it endorsed
treaties and encouraged expansion of the EU’s role in enhancing
verification regimes, assistance programs, export controls, and other
initiatives intended to improve the security of WMD materials,
equipment, and expertise. It also included an ambiguous reference
to considering “measures aimed at controlling the transit and
transshipment of sensitive materials [and supporting] international
initiatives aimed at the identification, control, and interception of
illegal shipments.”30
On the first anniversary of the Krakow announcement, the EU
and its member states went further and committed “themselves to
contribute to the PSI and . . . take the necessary steps in support
of interdiction efforts.”31 Somewhat cautiously, this commitment
required the EU and its member states to “take the necessary steps in
support of interdiction to the extent their national and Community
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legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under
international law.”32 This statement illuminates several important
distinctions between the U.S. and EU approaches. These distinctions
are notable because they illuminate the different approaches of the
United States and the EU to security and terrorism issues generally. It
is also notable because the EU overcame these differences in defining
the ultimate shape of the still inchoate PSI.
First, the legal carve-outs in the EU endorsements are so
prominent as to raise questions about the EU’s willingness to commit
at all. In contrast, only a few days earlier, a Japan-EU Declaration on
Disarmament and Non-proliferation included no such carve-outs.33 The
addition of the carve outs in the EU’s PSI statement seems like a
blunt effort to push the United States to assume a more respectful
attitude toward the significance of the rule of international law and
the constraints it presents on the use of force. This difference implies
that the EU is willing to abandon the PSI if it engages in military
activities that are inconsistent with international law.
Second, the EU’s endorsement emphasizes the intelligence and
law enforcement aspects of the PSI—not its military measures.34
Similarly, at a recent PSI exercise hosted by Japan, the Japanese
government insisted that the U.S. Coast Guard play a more prominent
role than that of the Navy in an apparent effort to emphasize the
law enforcement aspects. Many members of the EU view the Bush
administration’s “War on Terror” as a grave mischaracterization of
the enemy and how best to neutralize it. Instead, they view the threat
posed by Al Qaeda and other nonstate actors as a matter for law
enforcement. So, while they have agreed to work with the United
States to halt trafficking in WMD, they believe that nonmilitary
agencies such as the Coast Guard should conduct its activities, with
the military playing supporting roles as necessary.
Third (and related), the EU’s statement is captioned “NonProliferation” not “Counterproliferation.” The distinction between
nonproliferation and counterproliferation may be significant. The
Initiative’s author, John Bolton, has correctly characterized the PSI as
a “counterproliferation” strategy, but in the end “nonproliferation”
may prove more politically viable (if less accurate).35 The EU’s
characterization of the PSI as “Non-Proliferation” raises the concern
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that it may reflect an impulse to dilute the Initiative’s essentially
military mission. Such an impulse should be resisted because the
greater strength of the PSI lies in its implicit willingness to use force,
if necessary, to prevent proliferation.
Another innovation of the PSI’s counterproliferation regime is its
focus on the weapons and materiel and not on the states. The PSI
targets the weapons—not the parties interested in acquiring them. The
source or intended recipients are legally and effectively significant
but only insofar as certain intended recipients are privileged to
receive WMD. When the maritime powers sought to end piracy in
the 18th and 19th centuries, they did not destroy harbor cities such as
New Orleans, Cartagena, and Port-au-Prince that welcomed pirates.
Instead, they hanged pirates. When Great Britain sought to end the
trans-Atlantic slave trade in the 19th century, it did not embargo the
United States, Brazil, or Cuba. Instead it captured slaving ships and
returned their human cargo to Africa. In this way, the PSI is less like
an embargo or a war and more like a movement for the suppression
of a vice. Consequently, it will help formulate a base norm that could
rise eventually to the level of universal norms much as the bans on
piracy and slave trade did. The PSI does not appear to target states
as an embargo or war would. Embargoes and wars ultimately must
come to an end, while universal norms endure. To construct a strong
norm against proliferation, one should look not only to states for
support.
Likewise, by targeting the WMD, not countries, the PSI creates a
sanctions regime that has considerable advantages over embargoes
and other counterproliferation strategies. Because it specifically
targets the WMD (and materials used to construct them, as well
as the systems used to deliver them), it offers the prospect of an
“exceptionally smart sanction.” Traditional sanctions generally have
become disfavored as tools of coercion. They overreach, preventing
any goods from moving into a country or region, even necessities
such as food, infant formula, or medicine. This lack of discrimination
harms and alienates innocent people who have little or no ability
to affect their government’s behavior. So-called “smart sanctions”
have similar shortcomings. They feed corruption and fail to alter
the policy or behavior in question. An interdiction of WMD at sea
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would not constrain the flow of food, clean water, or medicine.
Consequently it does not lead to any collateral damage. Likewise,
a specific interdiction does not threaten the health and safety of
sailors on untargeted ships (i.e., those that are engaged in legitimate
activities) unlike other maritime blockades. It also avoids the perils
of “smart sanctions” because no new trading system is required; it
creates no incentives or mechanisms for corruption. Although there
is always the risk of mistakes, abuses, and the outbreak of war or
other escalations of conflict, the PSI does appear to offer an almost
perfectly discriminating sanction.
Another significant advantage of the PSI over more traditional
nonproliferation regimes is that it was brought into being swiftly
and can adapt rapidly to changing circumstances. Revising treaties
to bring them into alignment with changed circumstances is at best
a lengthy process. On the other hand, the ability to adapt quickly
means that the level of enthusiasm or support for the Initiative may
also change quickly; participants can drop out at virtually any time
and for any reason. Participants are bound neither by custom nor
by treaty—at least until a strong norm develops. Indeed, it will be
interesting to see whether some mechanism evolves for ensuring
that signatories remain in the PSI and adhere to its principles, even
when doing so would be awkward, inconvenient, or perilous for a
member or a nonmember participant. States may wish to find ways
to bind themselves in order to insulate their governments from
political pressures to defect. No doubt the Bush administration
has been frustrated by the withdrawal of Spanish troops from
Iraq following the railway bombings of March 11, 2004. Hence the
principal shortcoming of coalitions of the willing: the enemy can
alter a coalition member’s willingness to persist. The same can be
said for many of the legacy nonproliferation regimes. Export control
regimes, for instance, are entirely voluntary in an international
system in which state sovereignty is nearly sacrosanct; effective
enforcement of security norms remains exceptionally difficult—
in multilateral regimes as in coalitions of the willing. One way to
reduce the freedom to defect would be for the strong states to sign
agreements with longer termination periods or with obstacles such
as binding arbitration. In the end, however, state sovereignty will
always trump any such efforts.
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National Security.
History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed
to act.
National Security Strategy, 2002

The integrity of the PSI, therefore, depends on the extent to which
it promotes national interests. The U.S. commitment to the PSI is
reflected in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of
America.
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism
and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking
weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing
so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to
succeed . . . . In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace
and security is the path of action.36

Likewise, the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction—a document thin on details or on explanations about
how such a strategy can be implemented—is a statement about
U.S. interests that lends credibility to the PSI. “Weapons of mass
destruction—nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the possession
of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the great security
challenges facing the United States. . . . We will not permit the world’s
most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world’s
most destructive weapons.” While the strategy does promise to
extend new international arrangements to support nonproliferation,
it does not explicitly contemplate new arrangements to support
counterproliferation except to note that “WMD represent a threat
not just to the United States, but also to our friends and allies and
the broader international community. For this reason, it is vital that
we work closely with like-minded countries on all elements of our
comprehensive proliferation strategy.”37 The national strategy’s
Manichean use of the term “like-minded,” however, undermines its
credibility as an expression of U.S. interests. Peoples’ minds change
often. States do not possess minds. The United States would be better
served by a document and a strategy premised on cooperation with
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those sharing our interests in peace and security. It would be hard to
agree that Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea are like-minded, but the
United States should endeavor to bring these states into the Initiative
regardless of their mindset.
Arguably, all states share an interest in keeping WMD out of the
hands of those who would use them. While the ultimate objective of
the PSI is to halt the flow of WMD and those materials used to create
them, merely making proliferation more difficult and expensive can
reasonably be expected to reduce the threats these weapons pose.
The PSI offers to do this by reducing the number of parties who
have access to them and by reducing the number and lethality of
such weapons as do get shipped. In light of the potential harm these
weapons pose, the PSI need not be perfect or perfectly successful to
be exceptionally valuable. Once a weapon is used, every effort to
reduce the number and severity of subsequent attacks will seem even
more urgent than preventing the first such attack appears today.
III. HOW DOES THE PSI WORK?
The PSI promises to add three significant tools to the
counterproliferation kit: (1) increased sharing of intelligence, (2)
increased operational cooperation among participating states, and
(3) more robust interdiction principles.
Intelligence Sharing and Operational Cooperation.
First, the intelligence-sharing component has drawn widespread
praise as a step in the right direction. Who is against breaking down
the intelligence stovepipes to increase operational effectiveness?
However, there exists precious little information on which to base a
discussion about what, how, by whom, and with whom intelligence
is shared. Instead, we are left with questions, some of which raise
legal issues. Congress has not authorized the PSI or any funds
for its activities. Should legislation be amended to enable the U.S.
Government to share intelligence with those who do not have
appropriate clearances or with states that we do not generally share
with? Does any of this shared information violate domestic privacy
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laws (either in the United States, the EU or elsewhere)? Are suspected
traffickers in WMD due any special process? For instance, what
constitutes the reasonable suspicion standard for boarding a vessel?
Presumably this suspicion can be based on secret information that
the boarding party is unwilling to disclose, but where is this standard
expressed? And as for the information shared, are there limitations
on what can be shared or with whom? Must they be states? Can the
United States share misinformation to test the integrity of those with
whom it shares the information? Second, the Initiative’s operational
elements are not widely understood because they have not been
reported.
Interdiction.
Third, the Initiative’s most tangible and contentious contribution
is its agenda to interdict WMD shipments when necessary to prevent
proliferation. To date, most of the focus has been on this ambitious
tool. The need to develop such a mechanism drives the PSI. And
while exercises and indeed the few PSI operations have focused on
interdiction at sea, these operations eventually may mean that armies
enter sovereign and neutral countries to seize a shipment of WMD.
The PSI’s institutional basis lies not in a charter or a treaty but in the
Interdiction Principles agreed to by 11 countries in September 2003.38
These principles call on signatories to interdict nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons and the delivery systems or materials used
for making them—as they move from or to “states or nonstate actors
of proliferation concern.”39
Determining what falls into the category of “materials used for
making them” presents myriad complications because most such
materials are either dual-use or because various countries may have
vested interests in trading them. This is the sort of determination
that will ensure that the PSI never becomes a clear-cut enterprise.
Nor is there any reason to believe it could or should be simple or
“easy.” Indeed, if this type of determination were simple, then there
would be no need for either the International Atomic Energy Agency
or the World Trade Organization. Likewise, this kind of complexity
explains in part why slaves are still traded and piracy is still being
committed in the 21st century.
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In an age of distributed systems (e.g., networks of desktop
and laptop computers doing more work in this world than
supercomputers) and in which the once-near complete dominance of
the nation-state is giving way to a variety of entities with overlapping
jurisdictions at multiple levels (i.e., inter- and transnational and
regional organizations, states, sub-states, multinational enterprises,
nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and an increased role for the
individual), it seems logical that some important security functions
should become more flexible and rely on distributed decisionmaking
functions rather than state actors and the UN. And even though
there remains only one superpower, its own vulnerability to
asymmetric attacks and the limits of its power fall far short of
omnipotence and omnicompetence. In several important ways, the
UN Security Council, as envisioned by its 1945 Charter, was a model
of mid-20th century structures with its highly-centralized, statedominated decisionmaking apparatus. The PSI seems like a much
more appropriate decisionmaking apparatus for the 21st Century.
Its authority is diffused and opportunistic. The means at its disposal
are more diverse, and the dichotomy between the law of war and the
law of peace is blurred.
IV. WHO IS THE PSI AND WHAT ARE THEY DOING?
As noted above, the PSI’s flexible design and lack of a formal
organization make it difficult to evaluate the support it receives.
In some instances, its supporters may also be states of proliferation
concern for instance, if Chechen separatists were to seek to purchase
a nuclear weapon. This section discusses the fluid nature of support
for the PSI and what it is doing so far.
Supporters and Participants.
Over 60 countries—constituting a majority of the world’s maritime fleet and the vast preponderance of its naval might—are
participating in the PSI at some level. There appear to be several
categories of participants in the PSI. Each participant is a state. Core
members are signatories to the Statement of Principles, and each
has a navy or other maritime defense force that could contribute
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militarily to the Initiative. Other states participate at various levels.
Five small states that register significant shipping fleets have agreed
to participate at still another level by signing boarding agreements
with the United States. Other than the Statement of Principles, there is
no charter. The PSI is neither an organization nor is it governed by a
treaty.
The participants include Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia,
Singapore, Spain, and the United Kingdom, as well as the United
States.40 Dozens of other countries are participating in one way or
another. And while a coalition of the willing may not be a particularly
meaningful phrase when it comes to manning or supporting combat
operations in Iraq, there may well come a day when the participation
of Bulgaria or Bosnia-Herzegovina in the PSI does make a significant
difference.
Russia joined the PSI in May 2004—a signal moment in the
Initiative’s history in terms of increasing its legitimacy and
effectiveness. Russia currently has some 8,000 nuclear warheads
and the materials to assemble an estimated 80,000 more. Russia’s
arsenal is far and away the largest potential source of loose nukes.
Many of these weapons and materials are secured by nothing more
than a padlock and an unarmed guard. Russia’s participation in
any counterproliferation effort is critical. Russia’s signing on also
facilitated passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
According to the Economist, China has “said a few kind words”
about the PSI.41 China, however, is the only member of the UN’s
Permanent Five members that has not signed on. Unlike Russia,
China does not appear to be at significant risk as a source of loose
nukes. While it has a significant nuclear arsenal, these weapons
appear to be relatively well-secured. For China, then, there are really
two significant issues. First is the role China can play in bolstering
or denying legality and legitimacy to the PSI. The second arises from
China’s role as the principal patron of North Korea. There are also
issues related to China’s role as a significant player in the Western
Pacific—a vast region of real proliferation concern.
India and Pakistan have both been declared nuclear powers
since their respective 1998 tests of nuclear weapons. Neither had
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signed the NPT, so no legal obligations were violated. While India
has not yet joined the PSI, it appears to be laying the groundwork
for doing so by constructing a series of sensors designed to detect
the passage of nuclear materials near its vast coastline.42 Given the
historical tensions with its neighbor Pakistan and the recent history
of the notorious A.Q. Khan network in exporting WMD, it seems
only a matter of time before India joins the PSI. Inexplicably, India
may not have been invited to join the Initiative yet.43 Possibly Indian
concerns that Pakistan will be given a free pass by the PSI may be
causing it to withhold its participation until it is assured that Pakistan
will be included in any list of states of concern.44 At the same time,
India has expressed some misgivings shared with Pakistan about
the legitimacy of UN Security Council Resolution 1540’s imposition
of obligations on countries that do not have a vote in the Security
Council.45 Perhaps President Bush’s recent decision to allow India to
export peaceful nuclear materials will encourage India to sign on.46
Pakistan presents a more complex story in great part because
of its inability to control its own nuclear materials. When news
broke that A.Q. Kahn, Pakistan’s leading nuclear scientist, was at
the center of a transnational trading network and that he had made
numerous trips to Pyongyang, the government of Pervez Musharraf
averred that it was unaware of and had no control over the deals
being struck. This lack of control is troubling—more than the kind
of control Pyongyang exerts over its own subjects’ ability to export
WMD.
The PSI activities consist of meetings, exercises, efforts toward
planning or sharing information, and any interdictions that
eventuate. PSI exercises are the most visible display of the Initiative’s
work—short of the actual interdictions. At least nine meetings also
have been held.47 According to the State Department, “dozens of
countries have participated in or observed at least one of the PSI
interdiction exercises.”48 As of spring 2004, the PSI participants had
completed four maritime (in the Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the
Arabian Sea), and one air interception exercise (over Italy), as well
as one tabletop air interception exercise.49 In August 2005, a fifth
maritime exercise dubbed Deep Sabre was held in the neighborhood
of Singapore.50
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Early Successes.
Beyond these exercises, the PSI supporters claim that two actual
interdictions have already contributed significantly to the promotion
of peace and security. John Bolton claimed that the “interception, in
cooperation with the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, of the
BBC China, a vessel loaded with nuclear-related components, helped
convince Libya that the days of undisturbed accumulation of WMD
were over, and helped to unravel A.Q. Kahn’s network.”51 While Mr.
Bolton’s claim may gloss over a number of details that would tell a
more nuanced story, the fact is that Libya is moving with great speed
to conform to international norms and Dr. Kahn is out of business.
Any contribution made by the PSI to these significant steps should
be highly encouraging. In light of such successes, one might wonder
why the PSI was not launched years ago. The answer to such a
question may be revealed in a discussion of the political and legal
obstacles it faces.
V. LAW AND THE SEAS
The supporters of PSI must contend with the fact that a ship
flying the flag of one state on the high seas is generally immune from
interference by forces of another state. This basic principle underlies
much of international law and poses significant issues for those
seeking to justify a nonpermissive interdiction on the high seas.
Freedom of the Seas.
The first principle of maritime law remains that ships flying
the flag of one country are immune to the jurisdiction of another.52
This base norm of international law is subject to several important
exceptions developed through custom and treaty over the centuries.
However, should anyone find this rule quaint or antiquated, he
should recall that, throughout history, boarding another country’s
ships without legal justification has been deemed an act of war and
responded to in kind. The 1731 boarding of English Captain Robert
Jenkins’ ship, the Rebecca, sparked general war in Europe. Likewise,
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the British embargo of Napoleonic Europe earned it unintentional
enemies: the United States entered into a side war in 1812, principally
to defend freedom of the seas. A leading scholar of the subject notes
that if “the world wars of 1793-1815 established one legal principle
beyond challenge, it was that neither belligerents nor neutrals could
dictate maritime law. Future law, like past law, would be shaped
by belligerents and neutrals balancing contradictory interests on
the seas against the political and strategic implications of possible
choices.”53
Exceptions to Freedom of the Seas.
Sensitive to the importance of freedom of the seas, President
John F. Kennedy meticulously crafted the “quarantine” of Cuba in
October 1962 and had the Organization of American States authorize
it in order to minimize the risk that the Soviet Union would view
the seizure of ships as an act of war. The same concern remains very
much alive today. Shortly after the announcement of the PSI, North
Korea denounced it as a “brigandish naval blockade” much like
“terrorism in the sea and a gross violation of international law.” The
official daily, Rondong Sinmun, protested, “nobody can vouch that
this blockade operation will not lead to such a serious development
as an all-out war.”54 Notably, North Korea does not have a significant
naval force that could somehow retaliate in kind, were a PSI member
to interdict one of its otherwise lawful shipments. This inability to
respond proportionately could actually backfire and trigger general
war on the Korean Peninsula. If the United States wishes to gain
legitimacy for the PSI as a multilateral initiative, it must strive for
“both wider international participation and institutional safeguards
to restrain its own power.”55 Until then, states such as North Korea
will be able to denounce the PSI as an arbitrary tool for powerful
states to wield unilaterally against weaker states.
While unilateral action can destabilize international relations
radically, such a risk is sometimes necessary in the effort to develop
an important humanitarian norm. The United States and its original
PSI supporters have taken an appropriate first step and can now
guide the Initiative’s enlargement. In the early 19th century,
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hegemonic Britain was the first state to take a strong position against
the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Over the years that followed, Britain
was able to transform this moral preference into a universal norm.
The impulse to end proliferation, however, faces two obstacles that
the opposition to the slave trade never had to address. First, (as
noted above) today’s robust system of international law strongly
favors noninterference in other states’ affairs and freedom of the
seas. Second (also noted above), it seeks to implement change in the
long-standing and comprehensive global political system in which
each state has equal status. Britain’s unilateral policy to halt the
slave trade was developed at a time when the legal, political, and
military systems governing international relations were inchoate.
For the PSI to gain effectiveness today, its actions must be grounded
in international law and must minimize political instability.
The significance of interdiction of WMD depends on where the
acts take place. For interdictions at sea, this depends in turn on the
ship’s location and the flag it flies. The location presents the first
threshold issue. There are three categories of waters in which a
vessel might be found. First, a country’s “territorial sea” includes its
ports and harbors and extends 12 miles out from the coast. Within its
territorial seas, a state’s authority is at its zenith. Second, a maritime
state’s “contiguous zone” extends out across the next 12 miles of
ocean. Within this zone, states may police waters to enforce customs,
immigration, and sanitation laws.56 Third, on the high seas, no one
has authority over vessels flying the flag of another state except as
discussed below.
In the territorial sea area of a state (up to approximately 12
miles from the coastline) foreign ships in so-called innocent passage
generally are presumed exempt from boarding or seizures.57 A
government may search and seize a vessel found within its own
territorial waters, subject only to 1) a reasonable claim that such
vessel’s transit is “prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security
of the coastal state”, and to 2) any domestic law constraints (such as
criminal procedure, due process, unlawful searches, and takings).58
If either of these conditions is met, then the coastal state may
board a ship or permit another state to do so. With permission or
even preauthorization from the government of the state in whose
territorial waters the ship is sailing, another power may search and
23

even seize that vessel. For example, Kuwait and the United Arab
Emirates could give the policing powers permission to board the
ships of smugglers, pirates, and other miscreants sailing within 12
miles of their coastlines in the Persian Gulf. While suspicious vessels
would learn quickly of this possibility, their course adjustments to
avoid these waters might give the United States additional insights
about which ships to track. While this information may not lead
to an immediate boarding, it might prove useful at a later date. It
would also raise additional obstacles and thus the costs of trafficking
in WMD.
The first of these conditions—a claim that the ship poses a threat
to safety or security—can be overcome readily if the state credibly
claims that a vessel is carrying WMD. Article 19 of the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines innocent
passage:
(1) Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order, or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in
conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law.
(2) Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the
peace, good order, or security of the coastal State if, in the territorial sea,
it engages in any of the following activities: (a) any threat or use of force
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations.59

Article 21 continues to permit:
The coastal State [to] adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with
the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law,
relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all
or any of the following: (a) the safety of navigation and the regulation
of maritime traffic; . . . (d) the conservation of the living resources of
the sea; . . . (f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State
and the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution thereof; . . . [or]
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration, or
sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State.60

While none seem to be precisely on point in the abstract, in the
actuality, a state should have no difficulty shoehorning the threat of
WMD into one of these justifications.
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In the contiguous zones (extending generally 12 miles out from
the territorial seas), a state may “exercise control necessary to (a)
prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary
laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; or (b)
punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea.”61 Once again, lawyers will
likely find justifications for boarding a ship carrying WMD in the
contiguous zone of their state.
On the other hand, stopping, boarding, and or seizing a ship on
the high seas that is suspected of carrying WMD presents a variety
of thorny issues. As the UNCLOS62 explicitly notes, “The high seas
are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of
the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this
Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises,
inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: (a) freedom of
navigation.”63 There are notable exceptions to the general rule of
freedom of navigation. First of all, the captain or the owner of a ship
can waive it. There may be instances when that permission could be
secured, as, for instance, when the boarding party notifies the owner
or captain that the ship is suspected of carrying contraband. The
owner or captain may not have already known or may decide not to
face the consequences of incurring the boarding party’s displeasure.
Likewise, permission to interdict could be secured from appropriate
authorities of the government that has registered the ship. Interdiction
is also permissible where reasonable grounds exist to suspect64 a ship
of statelessness, engaging in slave trade,65 shipping narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances,66 committing unauthorized broadcasting,67
or piracy.68 The legal test for seizure is higher.
Indeed, it was an event such as this that triggered the formation
of the PSI. Acting on a tip from U.S. intelligence, Spanish special
forces boarded a North Korean vessel, the So San, on the high seas in
2002. They were justified in doing so because the So San was flying
different flags and otherwise masking its state. However, once the
Spanish determined that the So San was carrying Scud missiles to
Yemen and that there was no legal justification for keeping these
missiles from Yemen’s government, the Spaniards were obliged to
let the So San continue its voyage and deliver the Scuds.
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The characterization of certain actors as pirates and terrorist acts
as piracy presents a couple of intriguing possibilities for punishing
or possibly preventing future acts of terrorism. Ruth Wedgwood
labeled Al-Qaeda a pirate organization and the attacks of 9/11
piracy, concluding that members of Osama Bin Laden’s network
were enemies of civilization.69 While some scholars ridiculed
Professor Wedgwood’s thesis, it retains considerable heuristic value
and may provide a roadmap for building support from all states for
the policing of those who engage in terrorist acts. At the level of a
plain language interpretation, it is, however, incorrect—in light of
the UNCLOS’s narrow and explicit definition of piracy. Likewise,
her definition is not particularly useful when seeking to interdict
WMD at sea because either a vessel has the protection of a state or it
has not. If it has, then it cannot be labeled a pirate.
If a vessel has no state protection, then international law offers no
protection (other than the dictates of universal human rights). One
way to make use of piracy laws (along with universal jurisdiction)
lies in getting every state to renounce any organization that uses or
threatens to use violence against civilian noncombatants. The same
sort of step was taken in the Paris Declaration of 1856 when the major
maritime powers forever renounced privateering and effectively
made piracy a universal crime.70 The challenge of building universal
consensus has prevented the UN Security Council from defining
terrorism and probably will prevent the building of consensus for
labeling WMD trafficking as piracy. On the other hand, the Security
Council already has the authority to permit interdictions of WMD
on the high seas if it has the will. The Security Council could simply
pass a resolution authorizing all necessary means to staunch the flow
of WMD—an option it failed to exercise when it passed Resolution
1540.
Interdiction as Self-Defense.
Short of an explicit Security Council Resolution, there are other
legal arguments to support interdictions. The 1945 UN Charter
acknowledges that “Nothing in the present charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a member of the United Nations.”71 The malleability
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of this doctrine remains contested. The doctrine of preventive war
remains part of the U.S. National Security Strategy, but, as a matter
of fact, it appears to have been exhausted when WMD were not
found in Iraq and broad support for the U.S.-led war in Iraq failed to
materialize. The prospect of a preventive war may reemerge at some
late date, but it appears to have no more legitimacy than it would
have had prior to 9/11. A preventive seizure merely seems much
more defensible than would a preventive war.
The use of force under the PSI may or may not fall under the
classical definition of anticipatory self-defense, depending on
the circumstances and facts. 72 As a basis for the use of force, this
traditionally has been judged by the rule of the Caroline. The use of
force in anticipation of an attack is constrained by proportionality
and by a requirement that the threat “leaves no choice of means
and no moment for deliberation.”73 Surely, anticipatory self-defense
would justify U.S. destruction of a North Korean naval vessel
carrying nuclear tipped missiles toward San Francisco, even absent a
declaration of war. Short of that clear-cut case, however, anticipatory
self-defense may not legitimate an interdiction on the high seas.
Boarding Agreements.
Many merchant ships fly flags of convenience to avoid taxes, laws
about the work conditions of their sailors, and/or environmental
regulations. Some small states register these ships for small sums
that add up to a significant revenue stream. Even though they
were selected because of the implied promise that they will not
inconvenience ship owners, these states retain the legal authority to
board ships carrying their flags. Moreover, they are able to delegate
all of their authority if they wish. To date, five leading flag states
have signed boarding agreements, including Liberia74 and Panama.75
As a consequence, a large portion of the global merchant fleet is
flagged by states that either support the PSI or have signed boarding
agreements. More than half the world’s shipping fleet by weight is
liable to boarding with minimal obstacles.76 Interdiction of WMD
aboard these vessels no longer presents serious legal obstacles.
One should pause to note the tremendous feat of diplomacy that
has given the PSI members legal authority to board any of thousands
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of ships. If finding WMD is like searching for needles in a haystack,
it is worthwhile noting that the PSI members may now x-ray large
portions of that haystack. The timid might demur at the level of
persuasion that may have been applied in order to obtain signatures
on these boarding agreements. But no one has claimed that Liberia
and Panama signed under duress. Such a claim might have the effect
of nullifying the agreements.77
This situation also raises the interesting issue as to whether one
state can simply purchase some of another state’s rights. International
law does not specifically disallow the purchase from a state of the
right to board a vessel bearing its flag. So what is to stop South Korea
from offering to purchase this right from North Korea in exchange
for a steady supply of food and energy? For those trying to figure out
how the 50-year stalemate in Korea might end in a whimper rather
than in a bang, this could present an intriguing possibility. Likewise,
what is to keep the United States from making boarding permission
a condition of continued participation in regional security or even
free trade areas?
VI. STRENGTHENING THE PSI’S LEGITIMACY
A political scientist may question why the PSI should seek legal
authority in the first place. After all, laws are not death pacts, and the
consequences of WMD falling into the hands of a terrorist organization
could not be higher. Moreover, even leading international rule of
law jurists recognize that “a violation of the law is not necessarily
always deplorable and may even be a good thing.”78 The response, of
course, is that, by bringing the law along with policy, one continues
to support a system of laws—one which generally benefits those
seeking to maintain peace and security.
More formal and traditional initiatives to permit interdictions
are also being pursued. Along with the United States, the Londonbased International Maritime Organization has proposed amending
the International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation to criminalize the illegal
proliferation of WMD at sea.79 This laudable effort may succeed but
only to the extent of permitting boarding or interdiction upon flag
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state consent. What proliferating state will voluntarily give up this
right? Each of these PSI agreements is shrinking the sphere of freedom
in which proliferation can occur. At the present rate of progress, that
space eventually may become so small that world opinion considers
counterproliferation to be a base norm. This shift would make it much
easier for the United States or “like minded” countries to seek a
specific resolution of the Security Council to target the ships of one
rogue state. Making a similar argument, the Bush administration
has cited the Security Council Presidential Statement of 1992 as
authority for such interdictions.80 The Security Council itself did
likewise when passing Resolution 1540. But the legal authority of the
Presidential Statement is debatable and highlights the fact that much
work remains to establish the authority to interdict WMD at sea.
On the other hand, if the PSI does signal a move away from
centralized decisionmaking on issues related to international
peace and security, then it appears more worthwhile to pursue
regional arrangements rather than a global solution. Article 52
of the 1945 Charter preserves the right of regional organizations
or “arrangements” to deal with the maintenance of international
peace and security as appropriate for regional action such as that
performed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). So a
regional security organization, acting with the specific authorization
of each state in the region, might declare a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ)
and request that the Security Council help enforce it. The Security
Council could, in turn, pass a resolution pursuant to its authority
under Chapter VII of the 1945 Charter to authorize the use of “all
necessary means” to enforce the regional ban on WMD. Or states in a
given region could act without explicit resolution, supported by the
claim that they retain the right to do so, much as NATO did in 1999 to
prevent genocide in Kosovo. Lately, some states have been working
to establish an NFZ throughout the entire Southern Hemisphere.
The United States, Great Britain, and France consistently have
blocked such efforts in order to ensure that their own nuclear forces
remain unencumbered.81 What would happen if the Security Council
were able to establish such an NFZ in which it could license certain
states to carry nuclear weapons (or even other WMD) under certain
circumstances? Even in states that ban individual ownership of
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guns, law enforcement officers are permitted to carry. Such a system
would allow the nuclear states to have their proverbial cake (WMD)
and eat it too (refuse WMD to others).
The United States is already pursuing a different and yet equally
innovative regional policy. Pacific Command’s Regional Maritime
Security Initiative (RMSI) is building a “coalition of the willing” to
“counter transnational threats, including terrorism, maritime piracy,
illegal traffic (in narcotics, weapons, humans, and illicit cargo) and
other criminal activities in the Asia-Pacific region.”82 The overall
goal is “to develop a partnership of willing nations who work
together to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime
threats under international and domestic law.”83 By increasing the
range of states and organizations participating in this initiative
and by expanding the scope of activities it undertakes, the United
States appears to be creating the structure upon which the PSI can
be implemented. Given the vast portion of the world within U.S.
Pacific Command’s (USPACOM) purview—stretching from the
littorals of the Indian Ocean through the South Pacific and as far
north as the Bering Sea—the ambition is breathtaking. It is one
thing for Washington to issue a directive with global scope. It is
entirely another to develop operational capacity to implement it
in dozens of countries and over 100 million square miles of earth
and sea.84 USPACOM is undertaking cooperative efforts with
regional partners to increase situational awareness and informationsharing; to develop responsive decisionmaking architecture within
the region; to enhance maritime interception capacity; and to
increase agency, ministerial, and international cooperation.85 Little
information is publicly available with which to evaluate the RMSI’s
progress in these laudable efforts. It seems noteworthy that a military
commander (i.e., not a professional diplomat) is taking the lead on
this important multilateral diplomatic initiative.86 While the RMSI’s
official strategy paper mentions the PSI only as one of a number
of “cooperative security activities” it “complements,” the RMSI
appears to be the principal mechanism through which the United
States is institutionalizing the PSI agenda.87 At the same time, it offers
an innovative next step. One of its stated objectives is to “develop
seamless partnerships between governments and the private sector
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to balance maritime safety and security with free trade.”88 As such, it
echoes other U.S. initiatives such as the Container Security Initiative
and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism in their
efforts to bridge the divides between the government and the private
sector.89
It will be fascinating to watch how USPACOM handles a publicprivate partnership. It will also be interesting to see how various
agencies of the U.S. Government coordinate these initiatives, given
their overlapping interest in maritime security. Likewise, it will be
interesting to see if the PSI serves as a model for the formation of
peace and security policy and international law in an era increasingly
characterized by weak global organizations and renewed challenges
to international law.
VI. United Nations and Proliferation.
The Initiative’s supporters are pursuing a variety of means to
build legitimacy and political support. In addition to the boarding
agreements, international conventions, and regional arrangements
discussed above, they have been working to build support in the UN
Security Council.
Security Council Efforts.
On April 28, 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously passed
one of the most sweeping resolutions in its history.90 Basing its
authority on Chapter VII of the 1945 Charter, UN Security Council
Resolution 1540 decided that all states shall (1) refrain from providing
support to nonstates seeking WMD; (2) adopt laws prohibiting
nonstate actors from acquiring WMD; and, (3) take measures
to prevent proliferation. Only UN Security Council Resolution
1373—passed in the immediate wake of 9/11—comes anywhere
close to UN Security Council Resolution 1540 in its ambition.91 For
not only does it take a position on behalf of the Security Council, it
requires all states to pass domestic legislation to support its policy
determinations. Prior to these resolutions, most experts would
have agreed with the conclusion that there is “no legislature, in the
technical sense of the term, in the UN system . . . That is to say, there
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exists no corporate organ formally empowered to enact laws directly
binding on international legal subjects.”92 Ironically, President Bush
and John Bolton, two determined critics of the UN, have radically
expanded its capacity to act as a world government.93
Resolution 1540 originated in a proposal made by President Bush
to the General Assembly in September 2003. He explained the new
PSI briefly and requested that the Security Council “adopt a new
anti-proliferation resolution . . . [that would] call on all members of
the U.N. to criminalize the proliferation of weapons—WMD, to enact
strict export controls consistent with international standards, and to
secure any and all sensitive materials within their own borders.”94 In
doing so, Bush explicitly tied Resolution 1540 to the PSI. There are
no established rules of interpretation for Security Council
resolutions.95 That said, it does seem significant that the resulting
resolution actually goes further than merely to “call on all members.”
Instead it “decides that all States, in accordance with their national
procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws
which prohibit any nonstate actor to manufacture, acquire, possess,
develop, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist
purposes.”96 In light of the importance of the issues addressed,
the level of public scrutiny involved, and the legal novelty of UN
Security Council Resolution 1540, it seems fair to conclude that the
Security Council was endorsing the PSI. Does this comprehensive
endorsement extend to a delegation of Chapter VII authority to the
PSI’s decision makers? Would it allow the United States and other
directly interested states to use force to interdict passage of a nuclear
weapon (or a Scud missile) on its way to Yemen or Somalia?
Does UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Fully Legitimate
Aggressive Counterproliferation?
Apparently not. Or not yet. A British statement issued at the time
was intended to reassure those who resisted an explicit authorization
of interdictions on the high seas. “What this resolution does not do
is authorize enforcement action against states or against nonstate
actors in the territory of another country. The resolution makes
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clear that it will be the Council that monitors its implementation.
Any enforcement action would require a new Council decision.”97
Indeed, the United States dropped a provision explicitly authorizing
the interdiction of WMD at sea in exchange for China’s vote.98 The
United States was only able to salvage a provision in paragraph
10 that “calls upon all States, in accordance with their national
authorities and legislation and consistent with international law,
to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related
materials.”99 Resolution 1540 falls short of authorizing interdictions.
The State Department’s Andrew Semmel fairly characterized it: “The
PSI and 1540 are complementary. Paragraph 10 of the resolution
reflects this symbiosis.”100
What further authorization would be required to authorize
interdictions? While a new resolution pursuant to Chapter VII would
undoubtedly suffice, perhaps a less sweeping measure would also
work. Article 27#2 of the 1945 Charter allows the Security Council to
decide “procedural matters” by a mere majority. At some point, the
Security Council may decide that the implementation of Resolution
1540 by applying the PSI to specific situations (e.g., North Korean
exports) is a mere procedural matter.
Resolution 1540 raises several other significant issues. Most
notably, it requires states to prohibit proliferation to nonstate actors—
in effect legislating for members. The 1945 Charter, however, does
not grant the Security Council authority to legislate. As a nuclear
power and a nonpermanent member of the Security Council, Pakistan
raised this issue.101 Nor does the 1945 Charter provide the UN with
the democratic apparatus generally required for legislatures to make
legitimate law—at least in many states. Some arms control advocates
worry that Security Council legislation is inherently undemocratic,
that 1540 may undermine the multilateral treaties already binding
states to limit proliferation, and that 1540 undervalues the significant
obligation of states to reduce and eventually eliminate their own
nuclear arsenals.102 It seems unfair, however, to categorize Resolution
1540 as undermining existing multilateral treaties merely by binding
certain states to limit proliferation.
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VII. What Can One Man’s Army Do?
For Americans today, the burden of implementing the PSI falls
mainly to the Navy. Nonetheless, the PSI has significant implications
for the DoD in general and for the Army in particular. For while
the PSI is currently directed at maritime operations, it eventually
may be extended to land-based activity in regions where central
governments are incapable or unwilling to limit the proliferation of
WMD. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s most recent statement
appears to indicate that the PSI is now being directed toward landbased operations as well.103
The PSI and Resolution 1540 may signal a “paradigm shift” in
the use of force. For centuries, states exercised a monopoly on the
legitimate exercise of force. States could exercise it as part of a police
power domestically or in a war context (either abroad or during
internal conflicts). Since 1945, states also have had the ability to
delegate this war power to the UN. The distinction between police
work and warfare remained generally clear. Now Resolution 1540
and the PSI appear to be eroding that distinction by authorizing
the use of armed force on the high seas and possibly even within
the territory of nonconsenting states in order to staunch the flow
of WMD. For this to work, methods must be developed to ensure
that the use of force will be proportional and discriminating with
no collateral damage. In the past, proportionality and discrimination
were important constraints on warfare, but constraints weighed
against military necessity.104 At least for now, it appears that the
principle of military necessity may not factor into some operations.
If the Initiative does trigger a serious change in the use of force
paradigm, then the Army will need the capabilities to implement
it. A portion of the legitimacy that the PSI is developing appears
to stem from the great specificity of its operations. To extend use
of force to land operations will probably demand an exceptional
level of accuracy in its ability to discriminate between targets and
nontargets. This suggests new roles for special forces. While some
of these functions have presumably been undertaken by nonmilitary
intelligence agencies (i.e., the Central Intelligence Agency or other
states’ foreign intelligence agencies), they may migrate to the more
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regular armed forces in order to ensure compliance with the law and
responsible oversight. Consequently, military lawyers will need to
write new rules of engagement. Special forces will need to arm and
train for counterproliferation operations.
Likewise, Army officers in regional commands should help
drive and implement the PSI in countries of concern. Such work
will require diplomatic skills, technological assistance, and capacitybuilding. Some of these operations will take place uninvited, i.e., in
hostile countries. Some of them will take place in countries where the
government is not hostile but cannot control the territory where the
proliferation is occurring; soldiers will need to liaise carefully with
their in-country partners to ensure that relations do not deteriorate.
Counterproliferation efforts should and will expand dramatically
in regions around the world and may soon draw on low-intensity use
of force in states where the central governments are ineffective in their
own efforts to control WMD. The problems of nuclear proliferation,
and especially loose nukes, remain intractable and demand a policy
that is coordinated—at least within the U.S. Government. One of the
shortcomings of the PSI is that, in the effort to keep it flexible, there
does not appear to be a lead agency. If there were a lead U.S. agency,
it would likely be the Navy. If it were the Navy, then there could
be effective liaison with the Army that should be given the lead on
tackling the issue of land-based loose nukes. As it is, the National
Security Council must attempt coordination—hardly a situation
that is likely to lead to the kind of long-term synergies that these
issues merit. A May 2002 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
Report surveyed the known incidents of smuggling of materials
usable for nuclear weapons since 1992 and examined 20 in some
detail. In virtually every incident, police or customs seized the
materials on land. This may merely reflect the difficulty of detecting
or seizing such materials at sea, or it may reflect a reality that the
more important problem is the transit of materials on land. The GAO
Report concludes that U.S. efforts are “not effectively coordinated
. . . with the result that some countries’ border crossings are more
vulnerable to smuggling than others.”105 Perhaps the Army could
take the lead on counterproliferation efforts based on its experience
with Nunn-Lugar operations.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The PSI’s participants are building legal and political support for
highly-focused use of force operations to counter the proliferation of
WMD. Eventually these efforts may mature into the formation of clear
and substantive law permitting highly-focused military operations
anywhere in the world in order to halt the flow or prevent the use
of WMD. Analogous movements in previous centuries took decades
to ripen into the universal bans on piracy and the international slave
trade. Over the past half-century, a similar norm has been developing
to prevent genocide. The struggles to end piracy, the slave trade, and
genocide have required decades. The threat of WMD is so great and
so imminent that we do not have decades for the norm to mature.
This recognition leads to several tentative conclusions.
Put the Cat Back in the Bag.
Certainly international peace and security would be well-served
were North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Should
that objective not be achieved, any agreement with North Korea
that acknowledges its right to retain its nuclear weapons program
should include a requirement that North Korea consent to having
its outbound vessels boarded and any WMD seized. After all,
counterproliferation makes sense only where the cat has not already
been let out of the bag. In the case of North Korea, the cat is out of the
bag, so the concern now is to bag the cat on the Korean Peninsula.
In the alternative, a specific UN Security Council Resolution could
endorse interdictions or to embargo North Korea. Perhaps China
could be convinced to abstain from a veto if the current negotiations
fail.
Embrace International Law.
Counterproliferation will be best served by harnessing international conventions, not marginalizing them. The UNCLOS should
be supported in part because it offers a legal framework for further
legitimating the PSI. Unlike 145 other nations and all but two
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members of NATO, the United States is not a party to the UNCLOS.
When the treaty opened for signature in 1982, President Ronald
Reagan’s Special Envoy on the Law of the Sea Treaty, Donald
Rumsfeld, worked to dissuade other countries from signing based
on the claim that it would protect U.S. interests insufficiently. As
Secretary of Defense in 2003, Rumsfeld reversed this position,
deeming the treaty’s protection of navigation rights as “critical to
the United States Armed Forces.”106 Two years later, however, the
administration has not moved to ratify the treaty, despite claims
that “it provides the only legitimate international framework for the
“Initiative.”107 In this instance, it appears that the administration’s
antipathy to multilateral conventions is undermining its capacity to
develop a robust coalition of the willing. The United States should
ratify the UNCLOS.
Broaden the Base.
The PSI has made great progress in terms of effectiveness and
gaining international legitimacy. Widening the coalition beyond
states would only enhance its effectiveness and may also accelerate
the formation of norms so essential for its eventual acceptance as
entirely legitimate. If the PSI is to succeed, it means rethinking certain
elemental components of the international legal regime. It means
authorizing actions that previously would have been undertaken
only under the rubric of war or deniable covert action. It means
continuing to build a robust coalition of willing states that have
few or no strong obligations to each other and one based on limited
common interests or purposes. Some of the Initiative’s participants
(such as the small countries that offer flags of convenience) may even
have been coerced into joining.
Open up the Discussion.
Exposing the PSI to a wider range of input should increase
international confidence in it and enhance its effectiveness. Building
it into a formal agreement with North Korea would give it additional
legitimacy and help limit the proliferation of WMD. Revealing the
levels of support for the PSI around the world would help establish
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the norm necessary for the creation of universal law. Dedicating
resources to help poor or weak states conform to the requirements
of Resolution 1540 would give additional legitimacy to the Security
Council’s ambitious legislative effort and presumably give the PSI
supporters more congenial legal frameworks. Likewise, opening up
the Initiative to participation by NGOs would also accelerate the
norm-setting process and increase the PSI’s capabilities.
To ensure responsiveness, efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness—and to capture the most synergies—the PSI’s leaders should
convene some sort of congress to discuss it, to bring up new and
useful ideas, and to work through the concerns of participants.
Moreover, participation in the PSI and in this congress ought not to
be limited to states’ governments. Many international organizations
(such as the UN’s general secretariat, the Tribunal of the Law of the
Sea, and the International Criminal Court), regional organizations,
humanitarian organizations, and other elements of civil society are
effectively stakeholders whose opinions should be consulted. The
marketplace of ideas may well yield ways to improve the PSI. In the
end, the governments may ignore their advice, but inviting intelligent
and well-intentioned people with different expertise and interests to
share their views may bring significant and useful insights.
At the same time, the supporters of the PSI could work to help
individual states reform their laws in order to conform better to the
requirements of Resolution 1540. As noted above, this resolution,
decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures,
shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any
nonstate actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport,
transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means
of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts
to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an
accomplice, assist or finance them.

The Security Council has established a 1540 committee to monitor
compliance. But many states lack the legal or institutional capacity
to conform in a timely fashion. The PSI’s effectiveness would be
enhanced greatly if it were expanded to provide the means for these
states to adopt appropriate legislation. This role easily could fit under
the Initiative’s mission of information sharing.
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The PSI has great potential. To date, however, some of its potential
has been masked by a hesitation to be exposed to the marketplace of
ideas. Little information is available publicly about the Initiative’s
intelligence sharing or efforts to increase the operational capacity.
The Initiative’s governance remains obscured. No complete list of
states participating publicly exists, let alone an official description
of what constitutes support or participation. Exposing the PSI to
public scrutiny could help generate additional new ideas and greater
support.
A Final Word.
The Initiative can play an important role in helping to staunch
the dangerous proliferation of WMD and the means to create or
deliver them. Whether through effective interdictions or by simply
raising the cost above what some terrorists can afford to pay—it
eventually may avoid untold destruction, suffering, and deaths. At
the same time, the PSI can help reform the international security
system by making it more flexible and responsive to the challenges
of the twenty-first century. To maximize the chances to achieve these
critical objectives, policymakers, soldiers, diplomats, and lawyers
should embrace dialogue and international law, not shun it.
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APPENDIX
INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES FOR THE
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
Proliferation Security Initiation (PSI) participants are committed to
the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated
and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), delivery systems, and
related materials flowing to and from states and nonstate actors of
proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and
relevant international law and frameworks, including the UNSC.
They call on all states concerned with this threat to international
peace and security to join in similarly committing to:
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with
other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their
delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and
nonstate actors of proliferation concern. “States or nonstate actors
of proliferation concern” generally refers to those countries or
entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject
to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation
through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers
(either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery
systems, or related materials.
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant
information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting
the confidential character of classified information provided by
other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources
and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize
coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal
authorities, where necessary, to accomplish these objectives and
work to strengthen, when necessary, relevant international law and
frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.
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4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding
cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the
extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their
obligations under international law and frameworks, to include:
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to
or from states or nonstate actors of proliferation concern, and
not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown
by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel
flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or
areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is
reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from
states or nonstate actors of proliferation concern, and to seize
such cargoes that are identified.
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag
vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMDrelated cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such
states.
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in
their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones
(when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes to or from states or nonstate actors
of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are
identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering
or leaving their ports, internal waters, or territorial seas that
are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as
requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and
seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause
shown by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from
states or nonstate actors of proliferation concern and that
are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize
any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights
through their airspace in advance of such flights.
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f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as
transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from
states or nonstate actors of proliferation concern, to inspect
vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably
suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes
that are identified.108
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
CSI:

Container Security Initiative, a U.S. initiative that
stations inspectors in major ports around the world to
ensure that WMD are not shiped to the United States

C-TPAT:

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, a
public-private initiative to ensure the integrity and
security of the supply chain

EU:

European Union

NATO:

North Atlantic Treaty Organization established under
the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949

NFZ:

Nuclear Free Zone(s)

NPT:

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow
July 1, 1968; entered into force March 5, 1970

PSI:

The Proliferation Security Initiative

RMSI:

U.S. Pacific Command’s Regional Maritime Security
Initiative

UN:

United Nations

UNCLOS:

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
done at Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 December 1982;
entered into force, November 16, 1994

US PACOM:

United States Pacific Command, a joint regional warfighting command that spans from the Indian Ocean
through the Pacific Ocean

WMD:

Weapons of Mass Destruction (generally biological,
chemical, nuclear, and arguably radiological)
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respect, PSI has received scores of mentions in the national media but little
analysis.
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the need for its prevention) and various political statements originating in the
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4. Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control,
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last visited August 18, 2005.
5. See Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe,
New York: Henry Holt and Company, Ch. 1, 2004, providing a distressing litany
of nonstate actors seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. This list includes Al Qaeda,
its various related organizations and copycats operating around the world; Jemaah
Islamiyah, active in Southeast Asia; Chechen nationalists; Hezbollah, active in
Lebanon and throughout the Middle East; Majlis-e-Amal and other pro-Taliban
anti-U.S. organizations operating in and around Pakistan and Afghanistan; and
“countless doomsday cults around the world,” similar to Aum Shinrikyo or the
Branch Davidians. Others might add Andean drug cartels. In other words, the
threat is global.
6. The July 2003 PSI Meeting in Brisbane cited North Korea and Iran as two states
of particular concern. See Press Release, U.S. Department of State, “Proliferation
Security Initiative: Chairman’s Statement at the Second Meeting,” July 10, 2003,
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For purposes of this article, WMD will include those materials targeted by the PSI
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that may be capable of proliferation without such acts being sanctioned by state
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